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A vast literature has focused on what causes businesses to move into informality and what is the
impact of an enlarging informal sector on growth. This paper shows that the size of the
informal economy also affects business cycle volatility. Informal businesses are usually small in
size, which not only prevents them from achieving economies of scale and from operating with
the right capital/labor mix, but also restricts their access to credit markets. Because firms
operating informally lack access to credit markets to neutralize the cash flow squeeze arising
during recessions, they are more exposed to fluctuations in economic activity and more likely
to fail. Using a Generalized Method of Moments methodology, this paper shows that countries
with larger informal economies tend to undergo increased volatility in output, investment and
consumption over the business cycle.
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I. Introduction
The informal economy has become a significant share of the economic activity of
many countries. When measuring the scope of the informal sector, the first obstacle
to overcome is obtaining a clear definition of what is being considered as informal
activities. Due to the measurement method used in obtaining proxies for the informal
sector, the definition used here is that of Schneider & Enste (2000): it encompasses
“legal value-added creating activities which are not taxed or registered [by
government entities] and where the largest part can be classified as ‘black’ or
clandestine labor.” (p. 79) Thus, the informal economy includes market activities
that are unaccounted for by the government, and, in this manner, are able to
circumvent tax payments. Household production not for trade, voluntary services
and criminal activities are not included.
Traditionally, labor market rigidities have been blamed for the growth of the
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informal sector. As the formal economy becomes unable to cope with the high
costs associated with labor legislation, the informal economy absorbs the displaced
workers. More recently, the informal sector has also been identified as a smallscale
entrepreneurial sector arising from workers’ decision to become self-employed to
avoid not only high labor costs, but also official taxation and the costs associated
with bureaucracy and corruption.
The informal economy encompasses in large part small business with restricted
access to credit and unable to rely on the legal system for the protection of property
rights and contract enforcement. A vast literature has shown that countries with a
large informal sector face lower growth rates: the need of informal firms to remain
small in order to avoid detection implies that achieving economies of scale,
operating with the right capital/labor mix, and, therefore, being productive is an
unfeasible endeavor (see, among others, Loayza 1997, Johnson, Kaufmann and
Zoido-Lobaton 1999, and Schneider and Enste 2000.)
This paper reveals that countries with sizeable informal economies also have a
tendency to experience more pronounced fluctuations in economic activity. The
second section of this paper briefly establishes the theoretical link between the
size of the informal economy and the fluctuations in economic activity. The third
section describes the data used in the empirical tests and the estimation
methodology. The fourth section addresses the estimation results and its
robustness, and the fifth section concludes.
II. Some theoretical considerations
The literature on the credit channel has discussed extensively the importance of
credit markets imperfections for the fluctuations in economic activity, and empirical
works supporting this view’s theoretical implications abound (see, among others,
Gertler and Gilchrist 1994, Bernanke and Gertler 1995, Hubbard 1997, and Bernanke,
Gertler and Gilchrist 1998.) In the presence of information asymmetries, the
equilibrium in the market for credit is characterized by credit rationing, as some
borrowers are shut off from having access to credit. As a consequence, these
credit-constrained borrowers are more exposed to fluctuations in economic activity,
since they are unable to smooth the fluctuations in cash flows.
For example, consider the impact of a contractionary monetary policy shock.
The consequent increase in interest rates affects firms by raising interest expenses
on existing debt, which decreases firms’ cash flows, and by depressing asset
prices, which reduces borrowers’ collateral. In addition, the rise in interest rates93  THE INFORMAL ECONOMY AND BUSINESS CYCLES
also slows down aggregate demand, reducing firms’ revenues and increasing the
financing gap.1 The corporate cash squeeze and the drop in net worth increase
firms’ external finance premium, which is the cost of raising external funds such as
debt and equity in excess of the opportunity cost of internal funds. The increase in
the external finance premium occurs because the lower the borrower’s financial
contribution in the implementation of a project is, the greater the potential conflict
of interest between the borrower and the external financiers. Thus, as the external
finance premium increases and the availability of credit falls, the enhanced swings
in production, investment and spending magnifies the initial contractionary
monetary policy shock.
This financial accelerator has been formally modeled by Bernanke, Gertler and
Gilchrist (1996, 1998). These authors have shown that a positive shock to
entrepreneurs’ wealth in the presence of credit-market frictions not only has a
significant impact on output, but also has relevant propagation effects. In other
words, changes in the wealth of entrepreneurs can significantly add to cyclical
fluctuations. The authors also point out the presence of an “excess sensitivity” of
credit-constrained firms to monetary policy shocks: these firms experience greater
volatility in investment in response to these shocks than firms with better access
to credit.
Gertler and Gilchrist (1994), for instance, have shown that in response to a cash
flow squeeze, small firms reduce inventories, production, employment and prices.
Large firms, on the other hand, respond to drops in cash flows by increasing
shortterm borrowing and inventories and by maintaining production and
employment levels, at least temporarily. This difference in behavior arises because
large firms have access to commercial paper markets and other sources of credit
unavailable to small firms. Thus, the workings of the financial accelerator imply
that markets dominated by small firms are more likely to experience greater
fluctuations in economic activity.
In this context, establishing a connection between the size of the informal
economy and business cycle volatility is straightforward. Informal businesses,
which are usually small in size, face greater credit limitations than small formal
enterprises. In developing countries, for example, when informal businesses have
access to external financing, they normally do so from illegal moneylenders that
advance small amounts at relatively high interest rates (see Loayza 1997, Dabla-
1 The difference between the uses and sources of funds widens because costs tend to adjust slowly
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 Norris and Feltenstein 2003, and Farrell 2004). As a result, informal businesses not
only tend to be subscale and unproductive, but they are also more likely to fail due
to their incapacity to smooth fluctuations in cash flows.
While in developing countries firms operating exclusively underground are
common, in industrialized countries, informal and formal activities are normally
undertaken within the scope of a single enterprise (see Gërxhani 2004). Nonetheless,
the need to avoid detection implies that this firm is likely to encounter tougher
credit conditions than a firm of the same size that operates exclusively in the formal
sector. When resorting to legal credit markets, for instance, the income and scope
of the informal activities must be omitted, harming the firm’s credit perspectives.
Therefore, in a cross-country data set, countries with larger informal economies
are expected to face greater business cycle volatility, although this link may be
weakened in places where the separation between formal and informal activities is
not clear-cut. As a result, it is important to consider the isolated performance of
high-income countries.
In addition, the motivations for firms to go underground in high-income
countries differ from those of firms operating informally in developing countries.
The costs of corruption, bureaucracy and poor law enforcement constitute the
main reasons for firms to operate informally in developing countries, while in
highincome countries firms undertake informal activities mostly to avoid the burden
of taxation and the rigidity in the labor market (see Gërxhani 2004). Particularly, if
the decision to undertake informal activities is due to high labor costs, then the
link between the size of the informal economy and the volatility of the business
cycle may not be as straight forward.
A vast literature has shown that price and wage rigidities augment fluctuations
in economic activity (see, among others, Akerlof and Yellen 1985 and Jeanne
1998). If the move into informality is motivated by the need to avoid restrictive and
costly labor legislation, a larger informal economy may actually be associated with
smoother business cycles. This result may emerge because informal firms’ costs
can adjust faster to shocks to economic activity than the costs of firms operating
in the formal sector (see Renooy 1990).
III. The data and estimation methodology
Unless otherwise indicated, the data was obtained from several editions of the
International Monetary Fund’s International Financial Statistics Yearbook (IFS).95  THE INFORMAL ECONOMY AND BUSINESS CYCLES
Where data inconsistency was found among different editions, the series was
spliced retaining the values of the most recent edition (2003).2
The econometric tests were run on four samples of cross-country data. The
choice of countries included in each sample was determined by the availability of
data.3 Two samples included countries with all levels of income, one with data for
the 1961 – 2002 period and another with data for the 1985 – 2002 period. The other
two samples included data for twenty-four high-income countries, with the same
breakdown of time periods. The reasoning for running the tests on these four
different samples is discussed below in the methodology section.
A. The size of the informal economy
The data used in the current study was obtained from the World Bank’s Doing
Business Database (2003), which, to my knowledge, is the only dataset that
provides information on the informal economy for a broad sample of developing
and developed countries. Here, a word of caution is warranted. Data availability
constraints led to the use of different methods to calculate the estimates of the size
of the informal economy of each country, implying that cross-country comparisons
may not be fully precise. Yet, the data used in calculating the estimates all refer to
the 1999/2000 period, which may minimize this shortcoming.
Measuring the size of the informal economy is a difficult task, and all methods
developed so far provide only rough approximations. The variety of methods
available has been discussed extensively in Schneider and Enste (2000), who
indicate the advantages and weaknesses of each approach. Three different methods
were used to obtain the estimates of the size of the informal economy (INFORMAL)
in terms of value added that are available from the Doing Business Database
(2003). For developing countries, depending on data availability, either the physical
input (electricity) method, the currency demand or the model (DYMIMIC) approach
was undertaken. For developed countries, either the currency demand or the model
(DYMIMIC) approach was used.4
2 Table A1 in the Appendix displays a list of all variables included in the tests.
3 Table A2 in the Appendix lists the countries included in each sample, the data and summary
statistics on informal sector size and business cycle volatility.
4 Note that the database does not allow the sorting of countries by the method used in the
calculation of informal sector size, which could improve the robustness of the results. For
details, see Schneider (2002). JOURNAL OF APPLIED ECONOMICS 96
The input method is developed under the assumption that electricity
consumption is the single best physical indicator of economic activity. If this is the
case, the growth rate in total electricity consumption is a proxy for the growth in
the overall economic activity, including both the informal and formal sectors. Then,
the growth rate of the official GDP can be subtracted from this proxy in order to
isolate the growth in the informal economy.
The currency demand approach, in turn, assumes that informal activities are
undertaken with the use of cash so as to avoid detection by the government.
Thus, a regression is estimated to isolate the excess demand for cash from an
increase in such activities. A weighted average tax rate is used to proxy for changes
in the size of the informal economy, while per capita income, interest rates and
payment habits are included in the regressions to control for other factors
determining the changes in currency demand.
Each of the methods above considers only one indicator capturing all effects
of the informal economy. Yet, the informal economy has simultaneous impacts on
the production, labor and money markets. The model (DYMIMIC) approach
estimates a set of structural equations, assuming that a few indicators affect the
size of the informal economy. These indicators are: a proxy for the volume of
monetary transactions, the labor participation in the official economy (as the informal
economy grows, labor is shifted away from the formal economy, in the form of a
lower number of workers or shorter working hours in the official economy) and a
flow of inputs (particularly, labor) out of the official economy.
Besides the methodology problem in calculating the size of the informal
economy, another possible shortcoming of the data is that the size of the informal
economy is expressed as a fraction of a country’s Gross National Product (GNP).
The use of a Gross Domestic Product (GDP) based measure may be considered
more appropriate, because most activities included in the Gross National Product
- but not in the GDP - are likely to be part of the formal economy. Moreover, the
informal activities whose performance matters for business cycle volatility are
those that take place within a country’s borders. Note, however, that, for most
countries, the distinction between GDP and GNP is not significant, and the choice
of a GNP based measure used here is, again, due to data availability.
B. Instrumental variables
Empirical evidence has shown that countries with greater growth rates tend to
have smoother fluctuations in economic activity (see Ramey and Ramey 1994) and97  THE INFORMAL ECONOMY AND BUSINESS CYCLES
a smaller informal sector (Loayza 1997, Johnson, Kaufmann and Zoido-Lobaton
1999, and Schneider and Enste 2000.) The tests conducted here used different
instruments to control for the possibility that business cycle volatility and informal
sector size are endogenous variables.
Empirical works on the determinants of the informal sector have highlighted a
number of variables that seem to influence the size of the informal economy (see
Johnson, Kaufmann and Zoido-Lobaton 1998 and 1999, Schneider and Enste 2000,
Friedman et al. 2000 and Farrell 2004). Overall, three factors have been found to
contribute to informality: limited enforcement of legal obligations, high costs of
operating formally and social norms.
Poor enforcement of legal obligations reduces the costs of operating informally
by diminishing the likelihood of detection and prosecution. In addition, high tax
burden, labor market restrictions, onerous bureaucracy and a high level of corruption
enhance the incentives for firms to go underground, and leads to a vicious cycle:
the high costs of operating formally increases the size of the informal sector, which
reduce government tax revenues, the quality of government services, and,
consequently, the incentives of firms to operate formally. Finally, in many countries,
avoiding taxes and regulations is considered a legitimate right of small firms
competing against large businesses.
The present study has used the following indicators as instrumental variables:5
- Rule of Law (RULELAW): this variable measures each country’s tradition for
law and order, the degree to which individuals have confidence in and abide by the
regulations. The indicator ranges from -2.5 to 2.5, with the lower scores reflecting
reduced law enforcement (base year: 2000).
- Corruption (CORRUPTION): this variable proxies for the degree in which
government agents use their political power for private gain. The corruption
indicator aims at capturing the fact that, while firms may be willing to pay taxes at
a reasonable rate, they may go underground to avoid extortionate and arbitrary
demands of public officials. The index ranges from -2.5 to 2.5, with the low scores
indicating higher level of corruption (base year: 2000).
- Employment Laws Index (EMPINDEX): this indicator encompasses information
about three different aspects of employment laws, namely, firm’s flexibility in hiring
workers, flexibility  in firing workers and the conditions of employment.  The
5 When available, the instrumental variables were obtained for the year 1997, two years prior
to the data available for the informal sector size. The reason for such choice is that the
institutional characteristics of a country that determine the size of the informal economy
should do so with a lag. JOURNAL OF APPLIED ECONOMICS 98
employment law index constitute a measure of protection of employed workers,
with higher scores indicating greater incremental cost for firms to deviate from a
hypothetical rigid contract in which job conditions are specified and workers cannot
be fired (base year: 1997).6
- Top Tax (TOPTAX): this index varies from one to ten, with a lower score
indicating a higher top marginal income tax rate for a corresponding income
threshold, and, thus, a greater burden from taxation (base year: 1997).
- Tax Policy (TAXPOLICY): this indicator measures the fiscal burden of the
government in a broader manner, accounting for the level of income tax rates,
corporate tax rates and trends in government expenditure as a percentage of GDP.
The index ranges from one to five, with a higher score indicating a greater fiscal
burden (base year: 1997).
The first two variables listed above were obtained from the Governance
Indicators Database (World Bank 2002); the third was obtained from the Doing
Business Database (World Bank 2003); the fourth from the Economic Freedom of
the World (Fraser Institute 1999); and the fifth from the Index of Economic Freedom
(Heritage Foundation 2003). Because these variables are related to the legal origin
of a country, they can be considered exogenous, as most countries had their legal
system set either through colonization or by direct or subtler imitation (see La
Porta et al. 1998 and Botero et al. 2004).
According to the definitions of the instrumental variables listed above, the size
of the informal economy is expected to be inversely correlated with CORRUPTION,
RULELAW and TOPTAX, and positively correlated with EMPINDEX and
TAXPOLICY.7 Table 1 shows the correlation between INFORMAL and each of the
instrumental variables. As pointed out by Johnson, Kaufmann and Zoido-Lobaton
(1998, 1999) and Friedman et al. (2000), poor law enforcement and the burden of
corruption constitute the main reasons for firms to move into informality. For
highincome countries, the rigidity of labor laws is also relevant for the size of the
informal sector.
However, as it was also pointed out by the referred authors, the correlation
between the variables capturing the burden of taxation and the scope of the informal
economy run in the opposite direction of what is expected: with few exceptions,
greater burden of taxation seems  to be associated with a smaller informal sector.
6 For a complete description of how this index is calculated, see Botero et al. (2004).
7 See Friedman et al. (2000) for a simple model formalizing the relationship between the
instrumental variables used here and size of the informal economy.99  THE INFORMAL ECONOMY AND BUSINESS CYCLES
Table 1. The size of the informal economy: Instrumental variables
1961 - 2002 Informal EmpindexCorruption Rulelaw Taxpolicy Toptax
          
(a) All 42 Countries
INFORMAL 1.000
EMPINDEX 0.441 1.000
CORRUPTION -0.731 -0.459 1.000
RULELAW -0.769 -0.506 0.971 1.000
TAXPOLICY -0.343 -0.169 0.215 0.264 1.000




CORRUPTION -0.631 -0.454 1.000
RULELAW -0.820 -0.598 0.891 1.000
TAXPOLICY -0.074 -0.004 -0.271 -0.091 1.000
TOPTAX -0.287 -0.247 -0.028 -0.036 -0.400 1.000
1985 - 2002     Informal   Empindex  Corruption Rulelaw  Taxpolicy Toptax
(c) All 45 Countries
INFORMAL 1.000
EMPINDEX 0.465 1.000
CORRUPTION -0.743 -0.517 1.000
RULELAW -0.764 -0.540 0.973 1.000
TAXPOLICY -0.375 -0.177 0.187 0.233 1.000




CORRUPTION -0.642 -0.500 1.000
RULELAW -0.825 -0.616 0.894 1.000
TAXPOLICY -0.008 0.120 -0.339 -0.153 1.000
TOPTAX -0.325 -0.359 0.093 0.053 -0.499 1.000
This result is only justified when higher tax rates allow for the provision of a
greater amount of public goods by the government and thus generate an incentive
for the firms to remain in the formal economy. Note, however, the correlation
coefficient between these taxation variables (TOPTAX e TAXPOLICY) and
INFORMAL are smaller compared to the other instrumental variables.8
8 The correlation between the measures of the burden of taxation and INFORMAL may be
distorted by the fact that the estimates of the informal economy size for some countries were
based on the currency demand method, which already accounts for the burden of taxation when
estimating the scope of informality. This aspect should not present problems for the results JOURNAL OF APPLIED ECONOMICS 100
C. Control variables
Several control variables are included in the tests to account for the importance of
other determinants of business cycle volatility. These variables are: two indicators
of financial development, the Solow residual, the inflation rate, government
expenditures, openness to international trade, and exchange rate volatility. The
median of these variables was calculated over the 1961-2002 and 1985-2002 periods,
except for the inflation rate and the Solow residual series: for inflation, the average
rate was calculated in each period, while for the Solow residual, the standard
deviation of the detrended series was obtained for each period.9
Recent empirical studies indicate that greater financial development contributes
to reducing the volatility of business cycles (see, for example, Ferreira da Silva
2002.) As financial institutions improve the process of screening potential
borrowers, the probability that financially unsound projects are externally financed
reduces, leading to smoother fluctuations in economic activity. Despite the
difficulties to precisely account for the efficiency of financial institutions in
screening and monitoring borrowers, two proxies of financial development are
used here:10
- LLY: this measure accounts for the size of the formal financial intermediary
sector, and it is calculated as the ratio of a country’s liquid liabilities to its GDP. The
motivation for using this variable is that more efficient, thereby more profitable,
financial sectors are more likely to absorb a greater flow of resources.
- PRIVATE: this variable represents the share of total domestic credit channeled
to the private sector. Financial systems that direct credit to private businesses are
likely to do so using more efficient screening and monitoring policies than those
that allocate a greater share of resources to state-owned enterprises.
The Real Business Cycle literature has emphasized the importance of technology
presented below because neither TOPTAX nor TAXPOLICY were included as instruments in the
baseline regression analysis (they were only included in the tests for the robustness of the
estimations).
9 For the detrending procedure, see the methodology section below.
10 The indicators of financial development are based on King and Levine (1993). Although the
authors propose two other indicators of financial development, the variables used here are
considered better proxies for financial development, particularly the variable PRIVATE. The
regressions were run using these other indicators, and the results are similar to those described
below (these outcomes are available upon request.)101  THE INFORMAL ECONOMY AND BUSINESS CYCLES
shocks in causing fluctuations in economic activity. These shocks are represented
by the volatility of the Solow residual (sSOL), which is calculated as the change in
the log of real GDP minus (1-a) times the change in the log of employment, where
a is the capital share of output and is set equal to 0.36. Note that, by using this
approach to calculate the technological shocks, we ignore the possibility that (i)
the residual is capturing more than just technological shocks11 ; (ii) some countries
may not have a Cobb-Douglas production function with constant returns to scale;
and (iii) some countries may have different capital shares. Additionally, the
calculation does not take into account a times the change in capital stock (Backus
et al. 1992 show that excluding this component from the calculations is not a major
problem). Yet, the lack of data renders alternative approaches unfeasible for the
moment.12
Three variables are used to account for the impact of monetary and fiscal
policy on business cycle volatility. The average inflation rate (MPOLICY) is used
to proxy for the stance of monetary policy. A few countries experience significant
changes in the average inflation rate over the two periods considered here, but the
results outlined below are not sensitive to inflation rate changes. The impact of
fiscal policy on the volatility of economic fluctuations, in turn, is represented by
the ratio of government consumption expenditure to GDP (GOV). For the
regressions run on the sample of high-income countries over the 1985-2002 period,
the stance of the fiscal policy was also measured by the ratio of the general
government structural balance to GDP, with the goal of isolating the cyclical
component of the government expenditures (SGOV).13
International trade and exchange rate policies are often linked to the volatility
of business cycles. Openness to international trade affects the fluctuations in
economic activity, albeit in an ambiguous manner: economies with fewer barriers
to trade are more vulnerable to external shocks, but they are also more capable of
11 Hall and Jones (1998) point out that the Solow residual may also be capturing other determinants
of productivity, such as quality of human capital, on-the-job training and vintage effects.
12 The difficulty in finding data to calculate the Solow residual is the main reason for having a
limited number of countries included in the tests. Where data was unavailable from the IFS for
certain years, additional data was gathered from governmental agencies and spliced accordingly.
13 Data for the structural spending of the government was available only for high-income
countries since 1980. Thus, the SGOV variable was calculated as the median of the ratio of the
government spending to GDP between 1985 and 2002 (International Monetary Fund 2006). JOURNAL OF APPLIED ECONOMICS 102
adjusting smoothly to domestic shocks by exporting them. OPENNESS is calculated
as the ratio of total trade – the sum of exports and imports – to GDP. The impact of
exchange rate policies is also uncertain, since fixed or flexible exchange rate regimes
will respond differently depending on whether the shock has a monetary or fiscal
origin. The degree of flexibility in exchange rate policies is represented by EXCFLEX,
which equals to the absolute value of the change in the exchange rate (SDRs per
unit of national currency).
Finally, Ramey and Ramey (1994) have pointed out that there is a negative and
statistically significant link between business cycle volatility and long-term growth.
LTGROW is estimated as the growth rate in the trend component of the log of real
GDP per capita.
Although all these control variables can be considered endogenous, they are
treated as exogenous in the tests below. This strategy biases the coefficients of
the control variables upward and the coefficient of the size of the informal sector
downward. Therefore, treating the control variables as exogenous is a
“conservative” approach in the sense that it reduces the likelihood of finding an
important role for INFORMAL while increasing the odds of finding a substantial
role for the control variables (see Acemoglu et al. 2003).
D. Estimation methodology
Each country has one observation for each variable for the 1961 - 2002 period and
one observation for each variable for the 1985 - 2002 period. The tests were run on
samples that included all countries for each period and samples that included only
high-income countries for each period.
Separating the countries by income and running the regressions is important
in order to point out differences that may exist in the performance of high-income
countries. For example, while the level of corruption is remarkably important for the
determination of the size of the informal economy when dealing with the full sample
of countries, when considering only high-income countries, the relevance of
corruption reduces while the rigidity of labor laws gains more importance (see
Table 1). Note, however, that the results of tests including solely high-income
countries should be considered with care, because of the reduced number of
degrees of freedom.
The tests were also run on two different time periods because the data on the
informal sector size for the majority of the countries is available only for the 1999/
2000 year. One could argue that an association between the informal sector size103  THE INFORMAL ECONOMY AND BUSINESS CYCLES
and business cycle volatility for the full time period (1961-2002) would not be
appropriate. Yet, to calculate the fluctuations in economic activity, we need time
series with a reasonable number of observations. To tackle this problem, the tests
were re-run using data referring to a time period (1985-2002) that is small enough to
establish the intended relation between informal economy and business cycles,
but long enough to allow the calculation of business cycle volatility.
In addition, an alternative data set for the size of the informal economy in
highincome countries was used. Schneider (2005) presents information for the size
of the informal economy of these countries for five different years in the period
between 1989 and 2002. The tests on the sample of high-income countries for the
1985-2002 period were re-run using the average of these observations.
Fluctuations in economic activity, in turn, are proxied by the standard deviation
of the business cycle component of real output, real investment and real
consumption.14  Detrending these series and the Solow residual is required before
running the regressions. Following recent empirical works on business cycles, a
band-pass filter designed by Baxter & King (1999) has been used to isolate the
business cycle component of each of these variables (see, among others, Basu
and Taylor 1999).
Band-pass filters are moving-averages designed such that the researcher can
determine ex-ante the periodicities of the business cycles by eliminating the
components of the data with frequencies out of a pre-specified range. This filter
has the following advantages over alternative methodologies, such as linear
detrending, first differencing or the Hodrik-Prescott filter: it removes unit roots,
rendering the time-series stationary; it does not alter the timing relation of the
variables; it isolates the business cycle frequencies without re-weighting
components; it constitutes an optimal approximation to the ideal band-pass filter;
and it generates business cycle components that are independent of the length of
the sample period.
The possibility that the size of the informal sector and the fluctuations in
economic activity are both being determined by some third factor, such as economic
growth levels, indicates the need to use an instrumental variables methodology.
The present work relies on a Generalized Method of Moments framework to show
the link between the magnitude of the informal economy and business cycle
volatility. In the presence of heteroscedasticity, which is common in cross-section
14 Henceforth, the expressions “the volatility of the business cycle component” and “the
volatility” of a series will be used interchangeably. JOURNAL OF APPLIED ECONOMICS 104
regressions, this procedure is more efficient than two-stage least squares. In
addition, GMM allows testing for the validity of the instruments. The estimated
equations have the following format:
sm
 = b1 + b2 INFORMAL + b3 X + e (1)
where sm represents the volatility of the business cycle component of the output, investment
or consumption series; and X is a matrix of conditioning information that controls
for other factors associated with business cycle volatility (it includes one indicator
of financial development at a time plus all other control variables).
Note that the use of GMM implies that the results should be interpreted as
providing evidence for the hypothesis that the exogenous component of the
informal economy size affects business cycle volatility. The exogenous component,
in turn, is determined by the institutional characteristics of a country, which are
reflected on all instrumental variables used.
IV. Estimation results
Overall, the empirical tests indicate that countries with a greater informal sector
present more pronounced fluctuations in economic activity. The volatility of the
business cycle component of output, investment and consumption increase as
the share of the informal economy grows, and this outcome is statistically significant
in most regressions. This outcome is in line with that of Bajada (2003), who has
shown that contractionary shocks in the legitimate sector of the Australian economy
have a more significant effect on the informal economy than positive shocks,
which implies that the underground sector deepens economic downturns and
augments the volatility of the business cycles.
The results become less robust, however, when the tests are conducted on the
samples including only high-income countries. As pointed out before, firms in
high-income countries do not normally operate solely in the formal or in the informal
sector, but, instead, they undertake activities in both markets. These firms may,
therefore, be less restricted in their access to credit in formal markets than firms
operating in the informal sector of developing countries. Thus, the reduced
significance of the size of the informal economy for the fluctuations in economic
activity in high-income countries is justified.
Moreover, while businesses in developing countries face greater difficulties
with corruption and law enforcement, firms in high-income countries may be moving105  THE INFORMAL ECONOMY AND BUSINESS CYCLES
into informality due to the rigidity in the labor legislation. Thus, undertaking
informal activities allows greater operational flexibility for these firms, which implies
that larger informal economies may actually be associated with reduced business
cycle volatility.
Another interesting aspect of the test results is the lack of importance of other
factors that are usually considered to be relevant in determining business cycle
volatility: most control variables lose importance as we add the informal economy
size to the regressions. Recall that the tests results indicate that the exogenous
component of the informal economy size, which is determined by the instrumental
variables, is relevant in explaining business cycle volatility. Because the
instrumental variables reflect the institutional characteristics of a country, the
irrelevance of the control variables is a finding that is in tune with the work of
Acemoglu et al. (2003): these authors show that macroeconomic variables appear
to have a minor impact on economic volatility once they control for the effect of
institutions. Therefore, the informal economy size seems to be one channel through
which weak institutions cause business cycle volatility.
This section is divided in three parts. The first two parts analyze the results
obtained when using data for both developing and high-income countries. The
third part presents the outcomes for the tests run using data solely for highincome
countries.
A. Fluctuations in economic activity and the size of the informal economy
The preliminary results depicted in Table 2 indicate that the size of the informal
sector is not only statistically significant, but also economically relevant in
determining the volatility of output, investment and consumption. Note that
PRIVATE is the variable proxing for financial development in the results shown on
Table 2; for the outcomes obtained when financial development is represented by
LLY, refer to the discussion about the robustness of the results in Subsection B
below.
Countries with a large informal sector experience greater volatility in the
business cycle component of output (Table 2, part a). INFORMAL is statistically
significant at the 1% level in the output regressions, whether the sample used
refers to the longer or the shorter time period. As an example of the relevance of
INFORMAL in explaining fluctuations in output, take the case of India whose
output volatility of 0.019 represents the median for the longer time-period sample.
If the size of the informal economy in India were to grow by 10% – from 23.1% of
the country’s GNP to 25.4% –, the volatility of output would increase by 12%. JOURNAL OF APPLIED ECONOMICS 106
The size of the informal sector is also statistically significant at the 1% level in
the investment regressions (Table 2, part b). In terms of economic relevance, a
10% increase in the size of the informal economy in Finland, the country whose
Table 2. Fluctuations in economic activity
                             (a) Output volatility     (b) Investment volatility   (c) Consumption volatility
                             1961-2002 1985-2002         1961-2002 1985-2002          1961-2002 1985-2002
C -0.046 -0.022 -0.117  -0.041 -0.039 -0.024
(-1.432) (-1.616)  (-1.607) (-1.221)  (-1.086) (-1.292)
INFORMAL  0.001***  0.001*** 0.003 *** 0.003 *** 0.001 0.001***
(2.540) (2.491) (2.819)  (4.240) (1.616)  (2.736)
PRIVATE  0.017 0.025*** 0.116 * 0.065 ***  0.032  0.029 **
(1.112) (2.600)  (1.940) (2.964)  (0.975) (2.299)
sSOL 0.157 ** -0.144 0.154 - 0.546 ** 0.109 -0.35 *
(2.206) (-1.161) (1.478) (-2.210) (0.973) (-1.905)
MPOLICY  -0.00003  -0.00005 ***  -0.0001  -0.0001  -0.00016 0.000002
(-0.762)  (-2.881)  (-0.815) (-1.007)  (-0.980)  (0.077)
GOV  0.097 0.005 0.057  -0.001 0.055  0.005
(1.225)  (0.187) (0.523)  (-0.013) (0.920) (0.126)
OPENNESS  0.001 0.001  0.017  0.005  0.020 *  0.003
(0.156)  (0.201) (1.140)  (0.330) (1.819)  (0.452)
EXCFLEX  -0.008 0.040**  0.292 0.032  0.378  0.021
(-0.240) (2.223)  (1.453) (0.564)  (1.407) (0.727)
LTGROW 0.226  0.064 -0.070 -0.283 -0.223  -0.119
(0.978) (0.720)  (-0.123) (-0.925)  (-0.557)  (-0.564)
n 42 45  42 45  42 45
J-Statistic  0.007  0.044  0.002  0.015  0.031 0.005
n*J-Statistic 0.277 1.995 0.102  0.655 1.302 0.240
c2
.05(1)  3.841 3.841  3.841 3.841  3.841 3.841
Notes: (1) Numbers reported in parenthesis are the t-statistics; *, ** and *** denote significance
levels of 10%, 5% and 1%. (2) Weighting Matrix: the GMM estimates are robust to
heteroscedasticity of unknown form. (3) Instruments: conditioning information set plus the rule
of law and corruption indices.
investment volatility of 0.063 represents the median for the 1961-2002 sample,
would raise the volatility of investment by 8.7%. The impact of the informal
economy size on consumption is less significant (Table 2, part c), but INFORMAL
remains statistically and economically relevant in the short time-period sample: a
10% increase in the size of the informal sector of Honduras, whose volatility in the
business cycle component of consumption represents the restricted sample median,
would raise consumption volatility by 22.6%.
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analyses, except for PRIVATE, which is significant at least at the 10% level in all
but two specifications and is positively related to business cycle volatility.15
B. Robustness of the results
The first test of the reliability of test results obtained with GMM is the J-statistic.
In all regressions run, the value of this statistic was multiplied by the number of
observations and compared with the table value of the c2 distribution with degrees
of freedom equal to the number of over-identifying restrictions. In all cases, the
instrumental variables chosen are considered informative (statistical significance
of at least 5%.)
Different strategies were carried out to verify the robustness of the outcomes
outlined in the previous sections. The tests were run using alternative
methodologies, alternative instrumental variables, LLY as the proxy for financial
development and excluding outliers. Overall, the size of the informal economy
remains statistically significant regardless of the route undertaken.
Prior to running the regressions using the GMM technique, all regressions
were run using two-stage-least-squares (2SLS). In all cases, the greater the size of
the informal economy is, the greater the volatility of the business cycle component
of output, investment and consumption. The results regarding the relevance of
INFORMAL obtained under 2SLS are either similar to those obtained with GMM or
with greater statistical significance.16
Besides the rule of law and corruption indices, three other instrumental variables
were used: EMPINDEX, TOPTAX and TAXPOLICY. The first refer to the flexibility
of labor laws, the second and third refer to the burden of taxation. The outcomes of
the regressions with these other instruments should be viewed with care, since all
of them have a much lower correlation with INFORMAL than RULELAW and
CORRUPTION in the samples including both developing and high-income
countries.
When testing with different instruments, two routes were undertaken. First,
each of these additional instruments was simply added to the initial regression
15 This positive relationship between PRIVATE and business cycle volatility is at odds with
previous research (see Ferreira da Silva 2002.) This outcome indicates that economic agents
are more likely to undertake speculative and Ponzi schemes as the economy moves towards a
boom, as suggested by Minsky (1986). As long as banks are there to finance these endeavors,
this aggressive behavior should bring about increased business cycle volatility.
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setting. Second, the variable CORRUPTION was dropped and each of the additional
instruments was included. The decision to use only up to three instruments at a
time was made because the finite sample bias increases with the number of
instruments.
Table 3 displays some of the results obtained with the use of different
instrumental variables. The numbers on the table refer to the coefficient of
INFORMAL and its statistical significance. The size of the informal economy
remains positively related to all measures of business cycle volatility, and, with
few exceptions, its coefficient is statistically significant at least at the 5% level.
Table 3. Robustness of the results
Alternative              (a) Output volatility   (b) Investment volatility (c) Consumption volatility
instruments
and controls 1961-20021985-2002 1961-2002  1985-2002 1961-2002 1985-2002
Baseline  0.001*** 0.001*** 0.003 *** 0.003*** 0.001 0.001***
regression (2.540)  (2.491) (2.819)  (4.240)  (1.616)  (2.736)
X, RULELAW, 0.0002  0.001*** 0.002 **  0.003 *** 0.001***  0.001 ***
CORRUPTION, (0.704)  (2.494) (2.292) (4.461)  (2.862) (2.668)
EMPINDEX
X, RULELAW, 0.0005 0.001***  0.004*** 0.003***  0.002*** 0.001***
CORRUPTION,  (1.057) (2.457)  (3.484)  (4.273)  (3.188)  (2.749)
TOPTAX
X, RULELAW, 0.001***  0.001*** 0.003** 0.003*** 0.001  0.001***
CORRUPTION,  (2.661)  (2.480)  (2.253)  (4.597) (1.518) (2.773)
TAXPOLICY
X, RULELAW, 0.0003 0.001*** 0.002*  0.003 *** 0.001***  0.001***
EMPINDEX  (2.483)  (1.996)  (4.462) (2.565)  (2.684)  (0.754)
X, RULELAW, 0.001** 0.001** 0.004*** 0.003***  0.001***  0.001***
TOPTAX  (2.398)  (2.327)  (3.201)  (4.274)  (2.936) (2.740)
X, RULELAW, 0.001*** 0.001**  0.003**  0.003***  0.001*  0.001***
TAXPOLICY (2.679) (2.373) (2.242) (4.635)  (1.715) (2.769)
Using LLY 0.001*** 0.0002  0.002***  0.001*  0.001*** 0.001*
(2.445) (1.189) (3.433)  (2.010) (2.665)  (1.704)
Excluding  0.001** -  0.002*** 0.002*** 0.001***  0.001***
outliers (2.167)  - (4.457)  (4.437)  (2.991) (2.612)
Notes: (1) The numbers in parenthesis are the t-statistics; *, ** and *** denote significance
levels of 10%, 5% and 1%. (2) There was no visible outlier to be excluded when the
dependent variable was the volatility of output.109  THE INFORMAL ECONOMY AND BUSINESS CYCLES
Also as a test of the robustness of the results described in the previous section,
LLY was used in place of PRIVATE as a measure of financial development. As
depicted in Table 3, the results obtained are not as strong, but INFORMAL remains
statistically significant at least at the 10% level in all but one regression specification.
As a final test of robustness, the regressions were rerun excluding outliers. A
sample of these regressions is also shown on Table 3. The results remain unchanged:
increases in the size of the informal sector augment the volatility of the business
cycle, and this outcome is statistically significant.
C. High-income countries
All the regression analyses conducted above were undertaken using data solely
for high-income countries. The goal was to identify any possible differences in the
performance of high-income countries. Overall, the results obtained were quite
unstable and few conclusions can be draw from them, due to the reduced number
of degrees of freedom.
Consider the results displayed on Table 4. Again, the numbers on the table
refer to the coefficient of INFORMAL and its statistical significance. The first
aspect to notice is that the regression results change dramatically with the financial
development indicator used. When financial development is proxied by PRIVATE
(baseline regression), the coefficient of INFORMAL is positive and statistically
significant at least at the 5% level in the investment regressions and in the
consumption and output regressions for the short time-period sample. However,
the coefficient is not statistically significant in the output and consumption
regressions for the full sample (negative and positive signs, respectively). When
LLY represents financial development, the coefficient on INFORMAL is negative
in all but one regression specification. None of these coefficients is statistically
significant, except in the output regressions.
All other control variables do not exhibit a uniform pattern, except for PRIVATE
(restricted sample) and EXCFLEX (full sample period): high-income countries,
where a greater amount of credit is channeled to private investors and with greater
exchange rate flexibility, exhibit increased investment volatility. These results are
available upon request.
The tests were also run using 2SLS, and the inconsistent outcomes described
above remained unaltered. The use of different instruments also does not alter
significantly the outcomes: a few of the results of the output and investment
volatility regressions using the short time-period sample are slightly different (mostly, JOURNAL OF APPLIED ECONOMICS 110
the coefficient of INFORMAL loses significance), but the results on the
consumption volatility regressions are unchanged.
In an attempt to further minimize the problem with the timing of the data for the
size of the informal economy, an alternative measure of the size of the informal
economy was used: INFORMALAVG. Although the coefficient on the variable
Table 4. High-income countries
Alternative              (a) Output volatility   (b) Investment volatility (c) Consumption volatility
instruments
and controls 1961-20021985-2002 1961-2002  1985-2002 1961-2002 1985-2002
Baseline  -0.0003 0.0004***  0.001*** 0.002**  0.0003  0.001***
regression (-1.686)  (3.009)  (3.574) (2.382)  (0.678)  (3.109)
X, RULELAW, -0.0002  0.0004*** 0.001*** 0.001 0.0003 0.001***
CORRUPTION, (-1.352) (2.970)  (3.533)  (1.403)  (0.663)  (3.465)
EMPINDEX
X, RULELAW,  -0.00001 0.0004*** 0.001*** 0.001***  0.0005 0.001***
CORRUPTION,  (-0.054) (3.287)  (3.290)  (2.915) (1.036) (3.413)
TOPTAX
X, RULELAW,  -0.0003 0.0003** 0.001*** 0.002*** 0.0003 0.001***
CORRUPTION, (-1.698)  (2.289)  (4.683) (2.573) (0.676) (3.435)
TAXPOLICY
X, RULELAW, -0.0002 0.0002 0.001*** -0.0001  0.0001  0.001***
EMPINDEX (-1.341)  (0.751)  (2.856)  (-0.201)  (0.250) (3.084)
X, RULELAW, -0.001*** 0.0002 0.001***  0.0002 0.001  0.001***
TOPTAX  (-3.921)  (0.809)  (3.153)  (0.434)  (1.914) (2.616)
X, RULELAW,  -0.0004* 0.0003  0.001***  0.001  0.0002 0.001***
TAXPOLICY (-1.968) (1.673)  (4.792) (0.711)  (0.531)  (2.850)
Using LLY -0.0004*  -0.001***  -0.0001  -0.000721  0.0002  -0.0003
(-2.019)  (-3.058)  (-0.343)  (-0.810) (0.450)  (-0.869)
Using  - 0.0001  - 0.001  -  0.001*
INFORMALAVG  (0.675)  (1.565) (2.311)
Using SGOV - 0.0004**  -  0.001**  -  0.002*
(2.402) (2.305)  (1.892)
Using  - 0.0004**  -  0.002**  -  0.002*
INFORMALAVG  (2.448)  (2.268)  (2.002)
& SGOV
Notes: (1) The numbers in parenthesis are the t-statistics; *, ** and *** denote significance
levels of 10%, 5% and 1%. (2) There was no visible outlier to be excluded when the
dependent variable was the volatility of output.111  THE INFORMAL ECONOMY AND BUSINESS CYCLES
proxing for the size of the informal sector remains positive, it loses significance.
Yet, the inclusion of the variable measuring the structural component of the
government spending (SGOV) ameliorates this problem: whether SGOV is included
along with INFORMAL or INFORMALAVG, the coefficient of the variable proxing
for the size of the informal economy is positive and statistically significant, normally
at the 5% level, in the output, investment and consumption volatility regressions.
In conclusion, the test results that relied on data solely for high-income
countries weakens the case for a relevant link between the size of the informal
economy and the volatility of the business cycle, though this outcome should be
viewed with care due to the reduced availability of data points. In addition, these
results may be just indicating that cross-country variation in the size of the informal
economy is relevant to distinguish the economic performance of countries with a
broad range of income and development levels, but once countries reach a certain
level of industrialization the scope of the informal economy is not as relevant for
the volatility in economic activity.
V. Concluding remarks
A growing informal sector has been blamed for contributing to hinder a country’s
economic growth. This paper has shown that there is an additional cause for
concern: countries with a large informal economy tend to experience increased
volatility in output, investment and consumption during the business cycle. The
small size of informal firms prevents them not only from being productive, but also
from having access to credit markets. The lack of credit makes them more vulnerable
to fluctuations in economic activity, as they are unable to buffer cash flows
squeezes. Because the informal sector is intertwined with formal business, the
larger the size of a country’s informal economy is, the more volatile the cycles in
economic activity.
The empirical tests run on samples including data of developing and highincome
countries have shown that the size of the informal sector is positively related to
business cycle volatility, and this outcome is not only statistically significant, but
also economically relevant. The results indicate that the exogenous component of
the informal economy size, which is determined by institutional variables such as
the rule of law and corruption, contributes to augment business cycle volatility.
Previous research has shown that macroeconomic policies constitute just channels
through which institutions affect economics volatility. This paper points out another
channel through which institutions matter to fluctuations in economic activity:
institutions are key in explaining the size of a country’s informal economy, and, as
informality grows, so does business cycle volatility. JOURNAL OF APPLIED ECONOMICS 112
The inclusion of the informal economy size in the regression analyses
conducted here reduces the importance of other variables thought to be relevant
in explaining the fluctuations in economic activity. Again, this finding reflects the
relevance of institutional characteristics in explaining business cycle volatility. All
these outcomes are robust to changes in the econometric methodology and in the
instrumental variables included, as well as to the exclusion of outliers.
Nevertheless, when considering solely the performance of high-income
countries, the empirical results are less conclusive. The magnitude of the informal
sector is positively correlated with business cycle volatility in some regression
specifications, and negatively correlated in others. Moreover, its statistical
significance is also inconsistent across the several tests described here. Besides
the problem associated with the efficiency of the estimation procedure, other factors
may lead to this weak result.
First, businesses in high-income countries do not normally operate solely in
informality; often, they undertake both formal and informal activities. Thus, firms
in high-income countries, when operating in the informal sector, are possibly less
financing constrained than firms in developing countries, which normally operate
either in the formal or in the informal sector. Thus, the reduced relevance of the
impact of the size of the informal economy on the fluctuations in economic activity
is expected for the high-income countries sample.
Second, the need to avoid the rigidity of labor legislation is more likely the
cause of informality in high-income countries than corruption and law enforcement.
If this is the case, the move into informality brings greater operational flexibility to
businesses. As a consequence, greater informal economies need not be associated
with greater business cycle volatility.
Finally, the weakened results found on the regressions including only high-
income country data may be just indicating that once countries reach a certain
level of development, the size of the informal economy is not as relevant to explaining
the fluctuations in economic activity. In future research, conducting panel-data analysis
using data for high-income countries may provide more conclusive evidence on the
link between the size of the informal economy and business cycle volatility.
Finding the causes of increased business cycle volatility is relevant because
greater fluctuations in economic activity have been associated with lower growth
rates in output, in investment (domestic and foreign direct investment) and in
employment (see Aisenman 1997, 2003). The overall results presented here point
to an important role of the informal economy in contributing to augment the
fluctuations in economic activity. Thus, institutional reforms that reduce the costs
of operating formally are key to reducing the size of the informal economy and
promoting smoother fluctuations in economic activity.113  THE INFORMAL ECONOMY AND BUSINESS CYCLES
Table A1. Variables
Indicators of economic activity
sY Standard deviation of the business cycle component of the real GDP
series
sI Standard deviation of the business cycle component of the real private
investment series
sC Standard deviation of the business cycle component of the real private
consumption series
Indicator of the size of the informal economy
INFORMAL Value added of the informal economy as a percentage of GNP, 1999/2000
INFORMALAVG Value added of the informal economy as a percentage of GNP, average
value for the 1989 – 2002 period
Instrumental variables
RULELAW Tradition for law and order - it ranges from -2.5 to 2.5, with the lower
scores reflecting reduced law enforcement
CORRUPTION Degree to which government agents use their political power for private
gain - it ranges from -2.5 to 2.5, with the lower scores reflecting greater
corruption
EMPINDEX Rigidity of employment laws - the higher scores reflect greater the rigidity
TOPTAX Top marginal income tax rate for a corresponding income threshold - it
ranges from 1 to 10, with the lower scores indicating higher tax rates
TAXPOLICY Fiscal burden of the government - it ranges from 1 to 5, with the lower
scores indicating less fiscal burden
Control variables
LLY Liquid liabilities as a fraction of GDP*
PRIVATE Claims to the non-financial private sector as a fraction of the total domestic
credit*
sSOL Standard deviation of the business cycle component of the Solow residual
series
MPOLICY Average inflation rate
GOV The ratio of government consumption expenditure to GDP*
SGOV The ratio of general government structural balance to GDP*
OPENNESS The ratio of total trade to GDP, where total trade equals the sum of
exports and imports*
EXCFLEX The absolute value of the change in exchange rate, which is defined as
SDRs per unit of national currency*
LTGROW The growth rate of the trend component of the log of real GDP per capita
series*
Note: * Median value over the relevant time period.
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